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Does Ohio's Collective Bargaining Act Unconstitutionally
* Delegate Legislative Authority to Administratively
Appointed Arbitrators?
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 10, 1989, the Ohio Supreme Court handed down City of Rocky
River v. State Employment Relations Board,1 holding binding arbitration
under section 4117.14(I) of the Ohio Revised Code to be a constitutional
delegation of legislative authority and not violative of home rule powers
granted to municipalities by the Ohio Constitution. 2 The 4-3 split decision
ended a lengthy legal battle between the city of Rocky River and the union
representative of the Rocky River Firefighters, Local 695, and, at least
temporarily, settled a constitutional debate among the justices of the Ohio
Supreme Court.
1. 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 103 (1989) [hereinafter Rocky IV].
2. Home rule provisions are frequently found in state constitutions and have the effect of
reserving strictly local issues for municipal entities to resolve. Craver, The Judicial Enforcement
of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21 B.C.L. REv. 557, 563 (1980).
3. After the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act [hereinafter Act] took effect in
April, 1984, the city of Rocky River [hereinafter City] recognized the Rocky River Firefighters,
Local 695 [hereinafter Union], as the firefighters' exclusive representative and commenced
negotiations with the Union toward the establishment of an initial collective bargaining agree-
ment. Rocky IV, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2, 539 N.E.2d 103, 104 (1989). Failing to reach an
agreement on various matters, the parties presented their positions to a mediator, and subsequent-
ly appeared before a fact-finding panel, as provided in the Act. At that hearing, the panel found
for the City on all contended issues except wages, on which the panel opted for the Union's
proposal. This prompted the City to reject the panel's recommendation, thereby invoking the
binding arbitration requirements of § 4117.14(D)(1). Id. at 2-3, 539 N.E.2d at 104-05.
Immediately following an adverse hearing before an arbitrator, the City initiated a declaratory
action in the court of common pleas based on its belief that the binding arbitration mandated in
§ 4117.14(1) of the Act violated both the state and federal constitutions. The lower court granted
the Union's motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 3, 539
N.E.2d at 105. Nonetheless, the Ohio Supreme Court narrowly reversed the court ofappeals and
held § 4117.14(1) to be unconstitutional insofar as it (1) unlawfully delegated legislative authority
to an arbitrator, and (2) interfered with a municipality's constitutional right to govern its internal
affairs. City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., 39 Ohio St. 3d 196, 530
N.E.2d 1 (1988)[hereinafter Rocky 1].
Rocky I1 represented the Ohio Supreme Court's response to multiple motions for "rehearing
and/or clarification." City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St. 3d
606, 533 N.E.2d 270 (1988) [hereinafter Rocky 11]. In that decision, the court clarified portions
of its Rocky I opinion, but otherwise denied the motions for rehearing. However, after Justice
Resnick replaced retiring Justice Locher on the bench, the court granted the Union's motion for
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Notwithstanding his thorough refutation of the city's home rule argument, 4
Justice Douglas passed quickly upon the delegation issue and made little
effort to explain the inapplicability of the "nondelegation" doctrine.5 Instead,
he summarily found the arbitration contemplated by section 4117.14(1) to be
lawful since the overall scheme contained sufficient procedural protections
and allowed for meaningful judicial review.6
This Comment seeks to more thoroughly develop, and ultimately resolve,
the delegation question raised by section 4117.14(I) by surveying the pertinent
decisions of other state supreme courts, as well as the explanations presented
in a number of secondary sources. Part II of this Comment provides an
overview of the Public Employee's Collective Bargaining Act to reveal the
operation and significance of binding arbitration in Ohio's new collective
bargaining statute. Part III examines the factors that have influenced courts
and commentators in their constitutional review of various binding arbitration
legislation, focusing on the question of whether arbitrators impermissibly
"reconsideration of the denial of the motion for rehearing." City of Rocky River v. State
Employment Relations Bd., 41 Ohio St. 3d 602, 535 N.E.2d 657 (1989) [hereinafter Rocky 111].
Upon further consideration of the briefs before it, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Rocky IV, found
the binding mandate of § 4117.14(1) adequate to withstand the City's constitutional challenges.
Rocky IV, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 20, 539 N.E.2d 103, 119-20 (1989).
4. Justice Douglas examined the constitutional debates that preceded the enactment of § 34,
article II of the Ohio Constitution and ultimately concluded that the section superseded the home
rule provisions of §§ 3 and 7 of article XVIII where the provisions conflicted. Accordingly, as
the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, with its component binding arbitration scheme
set forth in § 4117.14(1), fell within the ambit of § 34 of article II, home rule reservations of
local authority could not preclude binding arbitration between public employers and the exclusive
representative of local safety forces. Rocky IV, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 12-18, 539 N.E.2d 103, 113-
18 (1989).
5. The nondelegation doctrine "seeks to safeguard against excessive delegation and misuse
or abuse of delegated law-making power." City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich.
410, 513, 294 N.W.2d 68, 110 (1980) (Levin, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903
(1981). Professor Staudohar describes the doctrine as having its roots in the concept of
sovereignty, but questions the notion that the sovereign should avoid delegating its decision-
making power. Staudohar, Constitutionality of Compulsory Arbitration Statutes in Public
Employment, 27 LAB. L.J. 670 (1976). Professor Westbrook cites "[s]eparation of powers, the
common-law maxim against subdelegation, due process, and the principle of constitutional
supremacy" as possible bases of the doctrine. Westbrook, The Use of the Nondelegation
Doctrine in Public Sector Labor Law: Lessons from Cases That Have Perpetuated an Anachro-
nism, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331, 334 (1986).
Apparently, terse applications of the nondelegation doctrine are not uncommon. Professor
Westbrook notes that courts that have upheld binding arbitration schemes either avoid the
nondelegation issue altogether, or mention it only briefly. Id. at 358.
6. Rocky IV, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 12, 539 N.E.2d 103, 112-13 (1989).
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perform legislative duties. 7  Finally, Part IV applies the constitutional
determinants offered by the above authorities to Ohio's bargaining statute and
concludes that its compulsory arbitrati6n provisions lawfully delegate
authority to administratively appointed arbitrators.
I. Omo's PuLBc EMPLOYEE CoLLcrivE BARGAnInNG Act
Ohio became the thirty-eighth state to adopt public sector collective
bargaining legislation when Ohio Governor Richard Celeste signed Senate Bill
133, the Public Employee's Collective Bargaining Act, into law on July 6,
1983.8 The Act represents a strong piece of legislation that various unions
and interest groups had been encouraging for over two decades. 9 As an
indication of its vigor, section 4117.22 of the Ohio Revised Code dictates that
the Act "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purpose
of promoting orderly and constructive relationships between all public
employers and their employees." °
The cornerstone of the Act lies in its establishment of the State
Employment Relations Board (SERB), an administrative body composed of
three individuals, appointed by the Governor, to oversee the operation of the
Act." Under the Act, SERB is empowered to: (1) appoint various subordi-
nate officials, mediators, fact-finders, arbitrators, and other employees;
(2) hold hearings as provided by the Act; (3) maintain lists of interested
public employers and employee organizations; (4) designate appropriate
bargaining units; (5) conduct certification elections; and (6) monitor the state
personnel 1oard of review. 12 Most significantly, the Act recognizes the right
of public employees to engage in concerted activities and bargain collectively
7. The exclusion of state and local governments from the reaches of the National Labor
Relations Act has meant that the principles governing state and local employee relations largely
derive from state legislation and state case law. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 340. Moreover,
delegations of congressional authority seemingly generate little litigation at the federal level,
whereas state court challenges are commonplace. Id. at 362. For these reasons, this Comment
will focus on state statutes and decisions and will avoid constructing federal analogies.
8. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, Ohio's Public Employee Bargaining Law: Can it Withstand
Constitutional Challenge?, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1984).
9. Id. at 2-4.
10. Rebecca White and her co-authors consider the Ohio Act one of the nation's strongest
pieces of employee bargaining legislation given that it extends to virtually all public employers
and employees and that it grants public employees a number of rights, including the right to
unionize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike for most employees. Id. at 4.
11. OHIo Rev. ConE ANN. § 4117.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
12. OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 4117.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
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with their employers over "mandatory subjects of bargaining" (matters
pertaining to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment) and re-
quested modifications of an existing collective bargaining agreement. 13
Section 4117.04 affirms these rights by obligating public embloyers to
bargain collectively with the duly-certified exclusive representative (i.e.,
union) of their employees.
Beyond the mandatory subjects of bargaining and contract iegotiations,
public employers (although they may elect otherwise) are not compelled to
submit to collective bargaining. Section 4117.08(C) recognizes a number of
so-called "management rights," which the public employer may exercise
unilaterally without consulting the exclusive representative of its employees.
Nonetheless, whether a matter constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining
or a right retained by management may not always be readily discernible.
1 4
With regard to bargaining agreements effected under its terms, the Act
requires the parties to specify a grievance procedure and offers the option of
binding arbitration for unresolved grievances. Furthermore, the Act autho-
rizes public employers to deduct dues and other fees from the salaries of
union employees, as well as "fair share fees" from non-member employees.
15
Section 4117.11 enumerates various unfair labor practices for public employ-
ers and employee organizations (including certified exclusive representatives),
which are remediable under section 4117.12.
Finally, at the very heart of the Act, section 4117.14 establishes a detailed
system to govern the settlement of negotiation disputes. SERB first appoints
a mediator to facilitate contract negotiations if the parties cannot resolve their
differences through other means. 16 If an agreement is not reached, SERB is
then obligated to appoint a fact-finding panel at least thirty-one days prior to
the expiration of the parties' existing agreement. 17 After the panel submits
its findings of fact and recommendations, either the legislative arm of the
public employer or the members of the certified employee organization, may
reject the panel's recommendations; otherwise, the panel's suggestions are
incorporated in the parties' successor collective bargaining agreement. 18
Certain employees pursuing the former alternative are then given the right to
13. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.03(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
14. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 7-9.
15. Ouio Ra,. CODE ANN. § 4117.09 (Baldwin 1983).
16. Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(2) (Baldwin 1983).
17. OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(3) (Baldwin 1983).
18. Ono R-v. CODE ANN' § 4117.14(C)(6) (Baldwin 1983).
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strike if they provide adequate notice to their public employer.19 On the
other hand, members of police and fire departments, the state highway patrol,
and other safety personnel may not strike and must proceed to binding
arbitration ("conciliation" under the Act) as detailed in section 4117.14(G).2 °
The subsection at issue in Rocky IV, 4117.14(I), enforces awards made
pursuant to binding arbitration, stating that "[t]he issuance of a final offer
settlement award constitutes a binding mandate to the public employer and the
exclusive representative to take whatever actions are necessary to implement
the award."
III. THE CONsrTONAL D rEmirNANs
In exchange for denying safety forces the right to strike, the Act grants
them the right to proceed to binding arbitration if their contract negotiations
fail. 2 ' Such a scheme is commonly known as "interest arbitration" and has
been offered to similarly indispensable public employees in a number of other
states.22  In spite of its apparent popularity, however, binding interest
arbitration has been subject to constitutional attack in virtually every state in
which it has been introduced, 23 the most common allegation being that
binding arbitration constitutes an unlawful delegation of the state legislature's
authority.
24
19. Ouio REy. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Baldwin 1983). Professor Craver notes that
strikes are generally confined to the private sector, as most states have outlawed such action by
their public employees through legislation or judicial decision. Craver, supra note 2, at 557.
20. These employees are granted the right to have their dispute resolved by an impartial
arbitrator as a quid pro quo for the prohibition against work stoppages. White, Kaplan &
Hawkins, supra note 8, at 11. Such schemes have been employed by a number of state
legislatures, the appeal being that public employees can maintain their bargaining positions in
negotiations while the public is protected from the dangers of a protracted strike. Craver, supra
note 2, at 558.
21. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C) (Baldwin 1983).
22. "Unlike grievance arbitration, which involves the interpretation and application of the
terms of an existing contract, interest arbitration asks the arbitrator to engage in the formation
of the contract itself. Rather than merely interpreting the contract provisions, the arbitrator is
responsible for actually creating the contract." White, Kaplan & Hawkins supra note 8, at 11.
By 1980, twenty-seven states authorized the use of voluntary or compulsory interest arbitration
to resolve bargaining impasses in the public sector. Craver, supra note 2, at 558.
23. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 12 & n.56.
24. Craver, supra note 2, at 561. Other constitutional challenges have been predicated on
due process, equal protection, the one-man-one-vote doctrine, home rule authorizations, and the
governmental power to tax. Id. at 561-62.
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This charge is based on two considerations. First, the employers in these
disputes are governmental entities and, therefore, constitutional concerns
almost always arise when their obligations are voluntarily, or statutorily,
assigned to third parties.25  Second, unlike grievance arbitration, interest
arbitration essentially asks the arbitrator to create the collective bargaining
agreement for the disputing parties. Problems arise in this context as
arbitrators traditionally fix the wages, hours, and other working conditions for
the parties -- duties traditionally assigned to state legislatures. 26
In their review of various binding arbitration regimes, courts often seek
to determine whether the delegation of power to the arbitrator is
"administrative" or "legislative" in nature. Assignments falling in the former
category are constitutionally valid, while those falling in the latter are not.2 7
Yet, the task before the reviewing court is not merely one of classification;
rather, the court must determine "whether there are guarantees against an
excessive or unrestrained exercise of [the arbitrator's] power. "28 The Ohio
Supreme Court declared:
[A] statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it
establishes, through legislative policy and such standards as are practical, an
intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform
and further establishes a procedure whereby exercise of the discretion can be
reviewed effectively. Ordinarily, the establishment of standards can be left to
the administrative body or officer if it is reasonable for the General Assembly
to defer to the officer's or body's expertise. 29
Accordingly, Ohio courts must determine whether the statutory policy and
standards accompanying such a delegation impress upon the delegatee an
"intelligible principle" and whether the discretion accorded the delegatee "can
be reviewed effectively. "30  Other state supreme courts have articulated
similar constitutional tests and have further considered the presence of proce-
25. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 11 & n.55.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 12. Professor Westbrook points out that such distinctions may not only be difficult
to ascertain, but may also not exist at all, with legislation and administration being complementa-
ry rather than opposing processes. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 361 (citing L. JAFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTIoN 34 (1965).
28. Milwaukee Co. v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 31, 325 N.W.2d 350,
358 (1982).
29. Blue Cross v. Ratchford, 64 Ohio St. 2d 256, 260, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (1980).
30. Id.
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dural safeguards and the public accountability of the delegatee. 31 The follow-
ing sections of this Comment explore these factors, which have seemingly
influenced the courts and commentators in their constitutional assessments of
various binding arbitration statutes.
A. Standards for the Arbitrator
As a first step in their constitutional inquiries, courts traditionally examine
the standards upon which the arbitrator, or arbitration panel, should base its
decision. 32 These guidelines usually appear in the granting legislation as a
listing of variables for the arbitrator to consider, although some courts have
gone so far as to imply standards from the nature of the arbitrator's role, or
find sufficient guidance in articulated legislative policies. 33 Regardless of
their method of ascertainment, the standards recognized in various
jurisdictions differ widely both in their scope and precision. Some states set
forth a laundry list of specific factors for the arbitrator; others merely articu-
late several broad principles.
In upholding the constitutionality of 1969 P.A. 312, as amended in 1972,
the Supreme Court of Michigan was convinced that the eight standards set
forth in section 9 of the act "significantly channeled" the discretion of the
arbitration panel. 34  Representing one of the more elaborate legislative
schemes, section 9 provided:
[Tihe arbitration panel shall base its findings, opinions and order upon the
following factors, as applicable:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the
unit of government to meet those costs.
(d) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the
employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and
conditions of employment of other employees performing similar services and
with other employees generally:
(i) In public employment in comparable communities.
(ii) In private employment in comparable communities.
(e) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly
known as the cost of living.
31. See notes 50-91 and accompanying text, infi'a.
32. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 14.
33. Id. at 15. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text, infra.
34. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 453, 294 N.W.2d 68, 81
(1980).
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(f) The overall compensation presently received by the employees,
including direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other excused
time, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the
continuity and stability of employment, and all other benefits received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of
the arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally
or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours
and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining,
-mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the
public service or in private employment.
3S
Similarly restrictive legislation adopted in several other states has also with-
stood constitutional attack.
36
States desiring to preserve a greater degree of discretion in their arbitrators
employ less stringent guidelines in their collective bargaining legislation. For
example, the Connecticut legislature recommended that the arbitration panel
take into account the following considerations, among others, in reaching a
decision: "wages, salaries, fringe benefits and working conditions prevailing
in the labor market, the ability of the municipal employer to pay, and the
interests and welfare of the employees." 37 Significantly, the Supreme Court
of Connecticut found these standards adequate in light of accompanying
procedural safeguards and "the impracticability of prescribing standards that
will precisely govern the outcome of every issue that may arise in contract
negotiations ... .38 The highest courts in New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Washington upheld comparable legislation. 39
Finally, where state legislatures failed to provide detailed standards,
several courts were willing to read standards into the legislative scheme,
uided by the labor market's increased reliance on arbitration or by clear
statements of legislative purpose. In Division 540, Amalgamated Transit
35. MICH. COMP. LAWs § 423.239 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Town of Arlingtonv. Bd. of Conciliation and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769,352
N.E.2d 914 (1976); Medford Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1431 v. City of Medford, 40 Or. App.
519,595 P.2d 1268 (1979); Milwaukee Co. v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14,325
N.W.2d 350 (1982).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473c(c)(2) (West 1985).
38. Carofano v. City of Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 635, 495 A.2d 1011, 1017 (1985).
39. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 332 N.E.2d 290
(1975); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick
Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane
Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976). But see Town of Berlin v. Santaguida,
98 L.R.R.M. 3259 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978), unenforced on other grounds, 181 Conn. 421,435
A.2d 980 (1980).
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Union v. Mercer Co. Improvement Authority,40 the New Jersey Supreme
Court, straining to find guidelines for the arbitrator in the state's collective
bargaining act, acknowledged the following "standards and criteria which are
inherent" in present-day compulsory arbitration:
[The arbitrator] must consider the public interest and the impact of his
decision on the public welfare. He must act fairly and reasonably to the end
that labor peace between the public employer and its employees will be
stabilized and promoted. He must make findings which are adequate, and
sufficient to support the award. 41
Accordingly, the court incorporated these "implicit" standards into New
Jersey's bargaining act and found the statute at issue to typify a "constitution-
al expression of legislative policy." 42 In City of Richfield v. Local No. 1215,
InternationalAssociation ofFirefighters,43 the Minnesota high court reviewed
an act similarly devoid of benchmarks for the arbitrator. Nonetheless, the
court upheld the legislation in qtestion because the public policy supporting
it supplied adequate guidelines for the arbitration panel and because it would
be difficult to formulate rigid standards to govern their decisions.
44
The state legislatures have expressed noteworthy differences regarding the
degree to which they have chosen to direct the decisions of their arbitrators
and arbitration panels. Yet, courts almost universally approve of the
guidelines set forth in bargaining legislation, most finding the mere listing of
such criteria sufficient to pass constitutional muster.45 This uniformity in
result may be the product of several influences. First, courts generally
require that the legislative standards embody only a mild degree of precision.
40. 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978).
41. Id. at 252, 386 A.2d at 1294.
42. Id. See also Superintending School Comm. ofBangorv. Bangor Educ. Ass'n, 433 A.2d
383, 387 (Me. 1981).
43. 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979).
44. Id. at 46-47. The Richfield court based its decision largely on the following statement
of public policy:
It is the public policy of this state and the purpose of sections 179.61 to 179.77 to
promote orderly and constructive relati6nships between all public employers and their
employees, subject however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this state to keep
inviolate the guarantees for their health, education, safety and welfare.
Id. quoting MIN. STAT. § 179.61 (1977).
45. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 15.
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For instance, the Michigan Supreme Court sought "standards at least as
reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits,"" while the
Washington Supreme Court merely required "standards or guidelines which
define in general terms what is to be done and the instrumentality or adminis-
trative body which is to accomplish it."47 Second, legislatures implementing
collective bargaining legislation in the past decade traditionally detail numer-
ous factors for the arbitrator to consider, perhaps desiring to avoid the
constitutional difficulties associated with less definitive standards. 48 Third,
the criteria appearing in various bargaining acts may differ only quantitative-
ly, not qualitatively. Professor Craver persuasively argues:
An examination of the different criteria specified in the various statutes
indicates to those familiar with the interest arbitration process the fact that most
of the prescribed standards merely codify those factors which seasoned arbiters
would likely apply even if no legislative guidelines were provided. This
conclusion is substantiated by the fact that experiences with arbitral decisions
in Michigan and Pennsylvania have demonstrated no discernible differences
between awards governed by detailed statutory standards and those not regulated
by any specified criteria.
49
B. Procedural Safeguards
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a binding arbitration statute
need only provide minimal guidelines to meet the so-called "standards"
requirement. Nevertheless, such guidelines alone cannot endure a constitu-
tional challenge; procedural safeguards such as rules governing the selection
of arbitrators, timetables for rendering decisions, requirements that opinions
be written, -and provisions for judicial review may also be necessary to
protect against arbitrary action by the arbitrator.50 The sections which follow
46. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 461, 294 N.W.2d 68, 86
(1980).
47. City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 463,553 P.2d 1316, 1319
(1976).
48. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 14-15.
49. Craver, supra note 2, at 567 (footnotes omitted).
50. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 16-17. "We do not merely focus upon
standards, however. Protection against uncontrolled discretionary power can be accomplished
by adequate procedural safeguards." Superintending School Comm. of Bangor v. Bangor Educ.
Ass'n, 433 A.2d 383, 387 (Me. 1981) (citations omitted). See also Dearborn Fire Fighters v.
City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229,231 N.W.2d 226 (1975) (twojustices find act unconstitutional
even though standards sufficient).
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outline safeguards deemed most important by courts in their review of various
mandatory arbitration schemes.
1. Selecting the Arbitrator.
Closely related to the principle of accountability,5' discussed later in this
Comment, is the process by which an arbitrator, or arbitration panel, is
selected to resolve a given impasse in negotiations. Although seldom
scrutinized, such procedures are of constitutional significance in that a well-
considered selection scheme provides an important protection against abuse
and the use of unqualified arbitrators. S2 The Michigan Supreme Court's
holding in City of Detroit is particularly instructive.53 In that case, the
majority was persuaded that recent amendments to 1976 P.A. 84, a section
that had previously troubled the court,54 had "greatly altered the atmosphere
of accountability surrounding the service of arbitration panel chairpersons. "55
Specifically, the state legislature made four noteworthy changes to the
original act: (1) it restricted eligibility for appointment as panel chairperson
(i.e., arbitrator) to members of a permanent panel established by the
Michigan Employment Relations Commission; (2) it added the requirement
that the chairperson be a resident of Michigan; (3) it required all members of
the permanent panel to qualify by taking an oath or affirmation of office; and
(4) it made the term of office of panel members terminable at will.56 In light
of these modifications, the once evenly divided court found sufficient
protections in the selection of the chairperson to uphold the constitutionality
of the bargaining statute at issue.5 7 Outside of Michigan, most selection
51. See notes 77-91 and accompanying text, infia.
52. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 380.
53. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d 68 (1980).
54. See Dearborn Fire Fighters v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226
(1975).
55. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 469, 294 N.W.2d 68, 89
(1980). Under the former procedure, the public employer and the public employees each selected
a delegate to represent their interests on a three-member panel. The third member of the panel,
the chairperson or arbitrator, was designated by the parties themselves, or, if the delegates could
not agree upon an individual within five (5) days, by the chairman of the mediation board. Also,
the chairman of the panel was required to be an "impartial, competent and reputable citizen..
MicH. CoMP. LAws § 423.235 (1969).
56. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 469-71, 294 N.W.2d 68, 89-
90.
57. Id. at 472-77, 294 N.W.2d 91-94.
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procedures have been met with judicial approval, although seemingly few
legislatures have provided statutes as thorough as 1976 P.A. 84 in its
amended form.5 8  Apparently, so long as the procedure provides some
assurance that an experienced and attentive arbitrator will preside over the
parties' dispute, courts will not invalidate the legislation in question.
2. The Arbitration Process.
Beyond providing a sound selection procedure, a collective bargaining
statute must adequately protect the due process rights of the disputing parties
before, during, and after the hearing before the arbitrator.5 9  Moreover,
"there must be no bias, favoritism, or substantive unfairness or illegality built
into the structure of the mechanism the Legislature chooses. "60 Nonetheless,
the various arbitration schemes chosen by the state legislatures have yet to
experience serious due process challenges. 6' The following summary is
representative of the arbitration procedure currently employed in most
jurisdictions and, presumably, is adequately tailored to meet due process and
other constitutional demands:
[The employment relations commission] becomes directly involved upon a
petition for 'mediation-arbitration. It initially investigates and determines
whether an actual impasse exists between the parties. The parties also select an
impartial arbitrator in a process similar to drawing a jury, by alternatively
striking names from a list provided by the [commission]. Initially, the
arbitrator must mediate and encourage settlement. Procedures are provided for
public hearings and public input. Before proceeding to arbitration the arbitrator
must give written notice of intent to resolve the dispute, at which time the
parties are entitled to withdraw their final offer. Prior to issuing. a decision,
either party may request an open meeting where argtiments are made in support
of their final offers. Finally, the arbitrator is prohibited from making a separate
and unsupported decision. Only one of the final offers from the parties may be
adopted, in writing, without modification.
62
58. See, e.g., City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256
A.2d 206 (1969); State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
59. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 37, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 416, 332 N.E.2d
290, 299 (1975).
60. Id.
61. Perhaps this is best explained by the fact that fairness and other due process consider-
ations are the primary objectives of and justifications for arbitration - a system which seeks to
equilibrate the bargaining positions of disputing parties by placing their controversy before an
impartial third party.
62. Milwaukee Co. v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 25-26, 325 N.W.2d
350, 355-56 (1982) (summarizing Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(CM) 6 (1981)).
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While courts generally avoid analyzing arbitration procedures in detail,
several tribunals have paid particular attention to the type of arbitration
selected by the legislature. In some jurisdictions arbitrators are authorized to
formulate any award they feel appropriate; however, most legislatures have
opted for "last" or "final" offer arbitration whereby the arbitrator must choose
the most reasonable final offer made by one of the parties.63 With regard to
the latter alternative, courts have disputed whether final offer arbitration
"significantly circumscribes what might otherwise be deemed a broad delega-
tion of legislative power. "64 In Carofano v. City ofBridgeport, the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the "last best
offer" arrangement indicated the legislature's emphasis to "induce settlement
of disputes by negotiation under the impetus that the most reasonable proposal
would probably gain acceptance by the arbitrators."6 However, Justice
Levin of the Michigan Supreme Court took a contrary position, contending
that last offer arbitration aggravated rather than cured the deficiencies of
Michigan's collective bargaining statute.6 He explained:
Unless one of the last offers coincides with what in the chairman's
judgment is the most appropriate award, the last-best-offer feature prevents the
process from yielding results reflecting the best public policy, producing instead
a result which may arbitrarily assess a penalty on the losing party measured by
the difference between the last offer selected and the award the chairman, if not
so constrained, would have made. Policy-making power is thus taken from
government and conferred upon the parties, the possibility of principled
decision-making is reduced, and the risk of non-uniformity is increased.6
Hence, although no court would base its determination solely on the mode of
arbitration available to disputing parties, the option chosen by the legislature
may very well influence the outcome of a constitutional challenge.
63. Craver, supra note 2, at 559-60.
64. Carofano v. City of Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 635, 495 A.2d 1011, 1017 (1985).
65. Id. See also City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 463-64 n.36,
294 N.W.2d 86, 86-87 n.36 (1980).
66. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 514-15, 294 N.W.2d 68, 111
(Levin, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
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3. Judicial Review.
Foremost among the procedural safeguards that must accompany a binding
arbitration scheme is the opportunity for meaningful judicial review of the
arbitrator's decision.68 Thus, while many collective bargaining statutes
suggest that the arbitrator's determination signifies the endpoint of legal
proceedings, 69 virtually all jurisdictions recognize at least a limited
availability of judicial review, either through legislation or judicial
interpretation. Defining the appropriate scope of judicial review, however,
presents a rather difficult task with regard to compulsory arbitration. Profes-
sor Craver explains:
If courts narrowly restrict their review function that they effectively provide
arbitral determinations with almost total deference, there exists that possibility
of catastrophic consequences resulting from an entirely intemperate award.
Conversely, if judicial intervention is liberally countenanced, one of the
fundamental objectives underlying interest arbitration enactments, the expedi-
tious and final resolution of bargaining disputes, may be substantially
compromised. The challenge is to apply standards of review that will
discourage frivolous appeals which only delay the impasse resolution process
while simultaneously permitting judicial intervention in those occasional
situations where corrective action is warranted. 70
A review of pertinent case law reveals that most courts apply a consistent
standard of review to arbitration awards, although they ascribe various titles
to their respective procedures. 71 Arbitration decisions tainted by fraud or
corruption are uniformly unenforceable if such influences are clearly
68. Although the grievance arbitrator's discretion is delineated by the terms of
the relevant bargaining agreement, the interest arbitrator possesses wide latitude
to recommend whatever final resolution seems appropriate. As a result of the
discretionary freedom enjoyed by interest arbiters, aberrational decisions may
occasionally be produced which reflect neither the desires of the parties nor the
realities of the pertinent employment market. To preclude the effectuation of
such deviant awards, some meaningful judicial review must be available.
Craver, supra note 2, at 571 (footnote omitted). See also note 22, supra. Professor Craver
argues thatjudicial review, except under certain circumstances, should only be available after the
arbitration proceeding has been conducted, as pre-arbitration review could inordinately delay
the arbitration process. Craver, supra note 2, at 568-70.
69. E.g., Oio Ray. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(1) (Baldwin 1983) ("The issuance of a final offer
settlement award constitutes a binding mandate to the public employer and the exclusive
representative to take whatever actions are necessary to implement the award.").
70. Craver, supra note 2, at 572 (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 573.
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demonstrated.7 2 Orders that contravene the procedural and substantive
standards set out in the enabling legislation, or that require the performance
of improper actions, are similarly defective and subject to reversal. 73 Also,
if the arbitrator impermissively ignores the guidelines fashioned by the
legislature, or interprets them in an obviously inappropriate manner, his
award should be vacated.74 Collective bargaining statutes embracing these
grounds for reversal or modification of the arbitrator's ruling have been
accorded judicial approval in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions. 75
Several state supreme courts have even articulated their own standards of
review where the statute in question either contained no express review
provisions, or was otherwise deficient.
76
C. PoliticalAccountability.
In addition to examining the standards and procedural safeguards of
binding arbitration statutes, courts have considered the degree of political
accountability vested in the arbitrator. The issue is rather unique in that most
legislative delegations are to administrative agencies or various public ser-
vants, whereas, binding arbitration statutes delegate decisional authority to
unelected arbitrators. 77 Simply put, the principle of political accountability
declares that fundamental policy decisions should be made by individuals and
political entities answerable to and elected by the people. 78
The political accountability issue has generated an interesting variety of
judicial opinions among the state courts. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
held that the arbitrator effectively becomes a "public officer" by presiding
over public sector labor disputes and that, collectively, these public officers
72. Id. at 573-74.
73. Id. at 574-75.
74. Id. at 576-77.
75. See, e.g., Carofano v. City of Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985); City
of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19,371 N.Y.S.2d 404,332 N.E.2d 290 (1975); Milwaukee
Co. v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.2d 350 (1982).
76. See, e.g., Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improvement
Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978). But see White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8,
at 17-18.
77. White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 18.
78. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 347.
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can be viewed as an "administrative agency. "79 Therefore, the state's
Firefighters' Arbitration Act was not unconstitutional on the theory that the
arbitrators, as private persons, were the improper recipients of legislative
authority.80 Wyoming's Supreme Court issued a similarly creative opinion,
contending that binding arbitration did not involve a delegation of power at
all since arbitration constitutes an "essential adjunct" to "genuine collective
bargaining."81
On the other hand, a number of state supreme courts expressly refused to
follow the imaginative Rhode Island example and found inadequate guaran-
tees of political accountability in various collective bargaining acts and city
charters. For example, in Salt Lake City v. International Association of
Firefighters,82 the Utah Supreme Court reasoned:
[The Fire Fighters' Negotiation Act] authorizes the appointment of
arbitrators, who are private citizens with no responsibility to the public, to make
binding determinations affecting the quantity, quality, and cost of an essential
public service. The legislature may not surrender its legislative authority to a
body wherein the public interest is subjected to the interest of a group which
may be antagonistic to the public interest.
The arbitrator/chairman of the panel is entrusted with the authority to
decide major questions of public policy concerning the conditions of public
employment, the levels and standards of public services and the allocation of
public revenues. Those questions are legislative and political, not judicial or
quasijudicial. The act is structured to insulate the arbitrator/chairman's decision
from review in the political process. It is not intended that he be, nor is he in
fact, accountable within the political process for his decision. This is not
consonant with the constitutional exercise of political power in a representative
democracy.8
3
High courts in Colorado,8 4 Kentucky, 85 and South Dakota8 offered similar
79. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 117, 256 A.2d
206, 211 (1969).
80. Id.
81. State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968).
82. 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
83. Id. at 789.
84. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976). The
Colorado Supreme Court expressly affirmed its reasoning in Greeley in City of Aurora v. Aurora
Firefighters Protective Ass'n, 193 Colo. 437, 566 P.2d 1356 (1977).
85. See City of Covington v. Covington Lodge No. 1, 622 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1981).
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explanations in invalidating the compulsory bargaining provisions before
them.8
7
Rather than concentrate on whether the arbitrator is "public" or "private"
in character, a number of authorities have foregone inquiries into political
accountability in light of the realities of modem compulsory arbitration. The
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that utilizing an independent arbitrator
may actually enhance collective bargaining proceedings, thereby justifying the
legislature's attempt to work a compromise between direct electoral
accountability and political independence:
There is also a pragmatic reason for the legislature's removal of the
arbitrators from the immediate pressures of public opinion. The arbitrators'
position is inherently one of trust; the parties must feel confident that the panel
will listen to their positions, weigh the evidence, consider the panel's statutory
obligations, and come to a reasonable decision. The legislature may well have
believed that exposing the arbitrators to more direct public input would
influence the panels and undermine the effort to prevent work stoppages.88
The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that action discriminatory to the public
will is unlikely since the arbitrator cannot have a personal interest in the
proceedings and his decision must be tempered by the standards set forth in
the enabling legislation.89 Finally, Professor Westbrook argues that the
primary concerns of the principle of political accountability may not be raised
by the use of independent arbitrators because the legislature retains its control
over fundamental policy decisions:
Most decisions on the terms and conditions of employment do not involve
truly fundamental issues. Issues that are important, but not fundamentally so,
are whether one job classification is paid more than another, whether seniority
or some other factor is determinative in filling certain vacancies or in deciding
who will be laid off, and whether unit employees have the right to submit their
grievances to binding arbitration. These are typical issues addressed in
collective bargaining. Decisions on the allocation of total resources among
86. See City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Fire Fighters, Local 814, 89 S.D. 455, 234
N.W.2d 35 (1975).
87. State legislatures fearing hostile judicial review may find it advantageous to establish an
arbitration agency, rather than rely on private arbitrators. For instance, the Nebraska state
legislature created the Court of Industrial Relations - a politically accountable administrative
agency empowered to resolve bargaining impasses. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to 838
(Supp. 1978).
88. City of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 276 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn.
1979).
89. Medford Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1431 v. City of Medford, 40 Or. App. 519, 525-26,
595 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1979).
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various state and local programs involve fundamental issues, but the allocation
of resources within particular programs and agencies, while important, involves
less fundamental issues. In sum, a review of the statutes and experience in the
various states indicates that it is highly unlikely that contract provisions dealing
with fundamental policy issues will be included in collective bargaining
contracts without significant legislative input.
90
Accordingly, these authorities wisely advise against placing "public" or
"private" labels on the arbitrator and instead recommend that courts seek
political accountability in the form of a general protection against arbitrariness
in the statutory scheme.
91
IV. Do THE Acr's PROVISIONS FOR BINDING
ARBITRATION UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DELEGATE
LEGISLATIVE AUTrorrY TO THE ARBITRATOR?
Viewed on the whole, the Act's provisions for binding arbitration, or
"conciliation" as phrased in the Act, must be considered a constitutional
delegation by the Ohio Legislature. As previously mentioned, binding
arbitration is employed as a strike substitute for safety forces in Ohio and
comes into being after repeated efforts at settlement between public employers
and employees, including negotiation, mediation, and a fact-finding, have
failed.92
The procedure by which the arbitrator 93 ("conciliator") is chosen to hear
a given dispute is not as formal as the scheme used in Michigan, 94 although
it does ensure that SERB will play an active role in the selection process.
Upon request, SERB issues an order to proceed to conciliation and submits
a registered list of five conciliators to the parties. 95 From that date, the
parties have five days to select a conciliator by alternatively striking names
from the registered list; if the parties cannot settle upon an individual, SERB
must promptly appoint a conciliator from its registered list, or from lists
90. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 375-76.
91. See Town of Arlington v. Bd. of Conciliation and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 777, 352
N.E.2d 914, 920 (1976).
92. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text, supra.
93. More than one arbitrator may be used, as necessary. If so, the determination of the
dispute must be by a majority vote. OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(9) (Baldwin 1987).
94. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text, supra.
95. OHIO Rv. Coo ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Baldwin 1983). OHIo ADMIN. COo § 4117-9-
06(B) (1987).
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maintained by the American Arbitration Association. 9 6 The conciliator must
be an Ohio resident. 97
The conciliator must conduct a hearing within thirty days of SERB's order
to arbitrate, or as soon as "practicable,"98 although he may still make efforts
at mediation." At the hearing, the conciliator must abide by the rules
promulgated by SERB and is granted supervisory powers comparable to those
exercised by judges in courts of law. 1°° Most importantly, the conciliator
must maintain a written record that documents the statements made at the
hearing and the report and recommendations of the fact-finder.'0 1 After the
hearing, the conciliator must resolve the dispute by choosing, on an issue-
by-issue basis, one of the parties' final offers.'0 2 This effectively limits the
range of opinions the conciliator can issue and, arguably, encourages settle-
ment.
103
In addition to the foregoing procedural protections, 10 4 the arbitrator must
consider the following factors in making his decision:
(a) Past collectively bargained agreements, if any, between the parties;
(b) Comparison of the issues submitted to final offer settlement relative to
the employees in the bargaining unit involved with those issues related to other
public and private employees doing comparable work, giving consideration to
factors peculiar to the area and classification involved;
96. Onio R'v. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Baldwin 1983).
97. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(13) (Baldwin 1983).
98. Onto Rav. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(2) (Baldwin 1983).
99. OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(1) (Baldwin 1983).
100. Pittner, DeTemple &Tremeti, Public Employee Collective Bargaining and Ohio Public
Employers: A New Perspective, 17 U. TOL. L. Rav. 719, 787 (1986).
101. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(6) (Baldwin 1983).
102. OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(7) (Baldwin 1983).
103. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text, supra.
104. Rebecca White and her co-authors argue against the constitutionality of the Act, partly
on the ground that the aforementioned protections "are but imperfectly included in Ohio's act."
White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 8, at 17. But "perfection" has never been required of
binding arbitration legislation. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text, supra. This is especially
true in Ohio, where courts retain a presumption in favor of constitutionality unless "overcome by
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt...." Rocky rV, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 10, 539 N.E.2d 103, 111
(1989). See also Medford Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1431 v. City ofMedford, 40 Or. App. 519,
523, 595 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1979) ("The wisdom of the statutory policy is a matter for the
legislature, not the courts.").
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(c) The interests and welfare of the public, the ability of the public
employer to finance and administer the issues proposed, and the effect of the
adjustments on the normal standard of public service;
(d) The lawful authority of the public employer;
(e) The stipulations of the parties;
(f) Such other factors, not confined to those listed in this section, which
are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of the
issues submitted to final offer settlement through voluntary collective
bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, or other impasse resolution procedures in
the public service or in private employment.
10 s
These standards ostensibly attempt to narrow the variables the conciliator can
weigh in his mind and certainly impress upon him "intelligible principles" to
guide his decision, as required of all legislative delegations in Ohio.
106
The Act also makes adequate provisions forjudicial review. By mandating
written findings of fact and opinions, a sufficient record is provided to make
court review meaningful. Section 2711 of the Ohio Revised Code governs
the review of all conciliation orders, which begins in Ohio's lower tribunals
-- the courts of common pleas. 10 7  Generally, the court is compelled to
confirm the award, but it is empowered to modify the award in cases of
obvious error and may vacate the arbitrator's order if elements such as fraud,
corruption, partiality, or procedural misconduct are proven.' 08 Hence, the
Act incorporates well-recognized grounds for review 0 9 while simultaneously
"promoting orderly and constructive relationships" 110 between the parties by
discouraging interminable litigation.
1 11
Although it is not completely clear that political accountability is
constitutionally necessary in Ohio, the fact that conciliators are unlikely to
confront fundamental policy concerns deprives the argument against constitu-
tionality -- that unelected arbitrators are insufficiently accountable to the
105. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(7) (Baldwin 1983).
106. See note 29 and accompanying text, supra.
107. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(H) (Baldwin 1983).
108. Pittner, DeTemple & Tremeti, supra note 100, at 789-90 nn.366-69.
109. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text, supra.
110. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.22 (Baldwin 1983).
111. But see White, Kaplan & Hawkins; supra note 8, at 17:
A party can seek to modify or to vacate the award, yet there exist serious statutory
strictures on a court's power to disturb an arbitration award. Such limited review is
tantamount to virtually no review, as the case law teaches that courts have taken a 'hands
off' approach to arbitration awards. (footnotes omitted).
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general public - of much of its force. Under the Act, the conciliator's
jurisdiction over public sector labor disputes is essentially limited to the
"mandatory subjects of bargaining." 112 Hence, the award the conciliator
issues, which is reflected in the newly created bargaining agreement, must
also respect those limitations. The conciliator will surely address important
topics; yet, she is extremely unlikely to threaten the legislature's monopoly
over fundamental policies.1 3 The conciliation award will not specify how the
state or local government should allocate its resources, nor will it delineate
the means by which the legislature should raise the necessary revenues; these
decisions remain in the legislative domain and are not subject to the arbitra-
tor's whim. Moreover, the Act ensures that the public interest will remain
a primary consideration by vesting the public employer (often a city or local
government) with the continuing obligation either to settle its disputes, or to
submit a reasonable final offer to the conciliator. Finally, Ohio's turbulent
labor history114 and the presumption of validity accorded to all Ohio legisla-
tion115 also urge a finding of constitutionality.
V. CONCLUSION
Public sector bargaining statutes typically employ compulsory arbitration
as a means to resolve negotiation impasses. Such schemes have experienced
constitutional challenges in a significant number of states, primarily on the
ground that the state legislature unconstitutionally delegated its authority to a
politically unresponsive arbitrator. Nonetheless, most state supreme courts
have found their statutes constitutionally sound and do not permit the so-
called "nondelegation" doctrine to invalidate such legislation.
112. See note 13 and accompanying text, supra.
113. See note 88 and accompanying text, supra.
114. In 1972, Ohio was tied for fourth place in the nation in the number of strikes
by safety forces. By 1973, Ohio had moved up to second place. There were
six strikes by police and firefighters in this state in 1975, again placing Ohio
second in the nation in the frequency of such strikes. The next year, 1976, saw
the number of safety forces strikes increase by half, to nine. That year, Ohio
gained the dubious distinction of ranking first in the nation, a position which
we [the state of Ohio] retained for three of the following four years. In 1980,
Ohio experiencedfifteen strikes by safety forces, involving 2,300 workers and
costing 6,800 lost workdays.
Rocky IV, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 19-20 n.16, 539 N.E.2d 103, 118-19 n.16 (1989) (citing BuRF-AU OF
LABOR STATirsncs, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1972-1980, (BLSR
434, 437, 453, 483, 532, 554, 582, 629, and Bulletin No. 2110, 1980) (emphasis in original).
115. See note 104, supra.
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Based on these holdings and the arguments of several commentators, the
binding arbitration arrangement in Ohio's Public Employees' Collective
Bargaining Act emerges as a reasonable attempt to resolve bargaining im-
passes involving safety forces. The Act provides a number of factors to
guide the arbitrator's opinion, a host of procedural safeguards (including
judicial review) to guard against arbitrary action, and an overall scheme
designed to prevent the conciliator from addressing fundamental policy issues.
These considerations strongly support Justice Douglas' conclusion in Rocky
IV that the "binding mandate provided in R. C. 4117.14(I) is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority ... .116
By selecting binding arbitration as a means to resolve certain public sector
negotiation impasses, the Ohio Legislature made a conscious decision to
abandon a long-standing labor relations policy which had failed to answer to
the needs of public employees and the general public. Professor Straudohar
appropriately reminds us that such necessary, but reasonable, innovations
should not be impeded by ancient constitutional doctrine:
As a theoretical shibboleth designed to preserve the status quo, [the
nondelegation doctrine] appears to be out of touch with contemporary notions
of operational flexibility. Government is charged with the responsibility of
providing services in a fast-changing environment. Demise of unwarranted
legal fictions is necessary in labor relations so that service to the public in
essential areas can function without interruption.11 7
Louis S. Cataland
116. Rocky IV, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 20, 539 N.E.2d 103, 119 (1989).
117. Staudohar, supra note 5, at 676.
[Vol. 6:1 19901
INTENTIONAL
BLANK

